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Abstract—We examine the impact of adversarial actions on
vehicles in traffic. Current advances in assisted/autonomous
driving technologies are supposed to reduce the number of
casualties, but this seems to be desired despite the recently proved
insecurity of in-vehicle communication buses or components.
Fortunately to some extent, while compromised cars have become
a reality, the numerous attacks reported so far on in-vehicle
electronics are exclusively concerned with impairments of a single
target. In this work we put adversarial behavior under a more
complex scenario where driving decisions deluded by corrupted
electronics can affect more than one vehicle. Particularly, we
focus our attention on chain collisions involving multiple vehi-
cles that can be amplified by simple adversarial interventions,
e.g., delaying taillights or falsifying speedometer readings. We
provide metrics for assessing adversarial impact and consider
safety margins against adversarial actions. Moreover, we discuss
intelligent adversarial behaviour by which the creation of rogue
platoons is possible and speed manipulations become stealthy
to human drivers. We emphasize that our work does not try
to show the mere fact that imprudent speeds and headways
lead to chain-collisions, but points out that an adversary may
favour such scenarios (eventually keeping his actions stealthy for
human drivers) and further asks for quantifying the impact of
adversarial activity or whether existing traffic regulations are
prepared for such situations.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
Due to the high relevance for modern society, preventing
and modelling traffic collisions has been a constant research
preoccupation in the past few years. There is a significant
number of publications on this topic and many of them
particularly address chain-reaction crashes (car pile-ups). For
example, Android-based prototype implementations for colli-
sion avoidance are discussed in [4]. Preventing pile-up crashes
in platoons where only part of the vehicles are equipped with
advanced warning capabilities is accounted in [2]. Stochastic
models for chain collisions are studied in [7] and [6]. More
accurate models for the estimation of crash probabilities based
on vehicle trajectory for autonomous driving are discussed in
[1]. Platoons with various penetration rates of inter-vehicle
communication units are taken into account in [18].
Since the first comprehensive security analysis of modern
vehicles in [11] and [3], dozens of attacks on in-vehicle
electronics are reported each year proving a high degree of
insecurity. Consequently, adversarial vehicle behaviour is as
realistic as possible. Dozens of works focused on assuring the
security of in-vehicle buses, e.g., [10], [13], [20], [19], did not
receive enough echo from the industry as none of the vehicles
on road today attains the necessary security level. This makes
vehicles trivial targets for determined adversaries.
Still, there is little attention focused on adversarial vehicle
behaviour, i.e., vehicles that are compromised by malicious
adversaries and misbehave while in traffic, deluding the driver
and other traffic actors, potentially leading to serious traffic
incidents that involve multiple vehicles, e.g., chain collisions.
The traditional adversarial setup for in-vehicle communication
assumes an adversary that tampers with data on insecure
buses resulting in malfunction of the vehicle, e.g., stopping
the engine, killing the brakes, etc. Such attacks are easy to
attain as long as existing in-vehicle buses, e.g., the Con-
troller Area Network (CAN), FlexRay or BroadR-Reach (an
Ethernet based technology), are lacking security mechanisms.
All the attacks reported so far were performed in isolated
environments and rarely on road, e.g., the Jeep hack incident1.
Moreover, damages are generally restricted to a single target
vehicle. In contrast, the view expressed by our work accounts
for the possibility of more than a single target vehicle and
opens road for more complex scenarios.
Structure of our work. For clarity, the main ideas of our
work can be summarized as follows:
• we emphasize on a view that stems from the driver-
vehicle-environment system and sets stage for adversarial
vehicle behaviour by which vehicles may misbehave,
e.g., delaying taillights, displaying false speedometer
readings, etc., (Section I),
• we discuss models for chain collisions in the presence
of adversarial vehicle behaviour and provide two metrics
for assesing the impact: the infinite collision bound and
the instant-reaction-collision speed gain (Section II),
• we discuss safety margins against adversarial behaviour
in an attempt to determine how existing safety rules
(such as the 2-second rule) translate in the presence of
adversarial vehicle behaviour (Section II),
• we provide simulations as overlays on existing maps
in order to gain a more realistic feeling and some
experimental data (Section III),
• we discuss two forms of intelligent adversarial behaviour:
adversarial platoon formation by which an adversary
manages to coagulate multiple vehicles and stealthy
speed manipulations that will allow an adversary to
progressively modify the speed of the car without being
noticeable for human drivers (Section IV).
1https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
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Fig. 1. The naive (open-loop) view of the driver-vehicle system: the driver exerts mechanical input over the vehicle body, mediated by potentially insecure
communication on vehicle buses
A. An extended view: the driver-vehicle-environment system
The classical view over automotive security assumes the
existence of a corrupted in-vehicle network (controlled by an
adversary) that mediates the interaction between the driver and
the vehicle. This may suggest the naive open-loop image over
the driver-vehicle system that is suggested in Figure 1.
The view that we advocate extends the simple open-loop
system from Figure 1 to a more complex closed-loop environ-
ment which is closer to the real-world model. In this setup, the
driver exerts mechanical input over the vehicle body which in
turn impacts the environment. Further, the driver continuously
receives acoustic and visual inputs from both the vehicle
and the environment. At least part of the driver actions are
mediated by the insecure communication from the in-vehicle
buses. But the adversarial nature of the vehicle also extends to
the environment. This is justified as other traffic participants
may be similarly corrupted vehicles that behave dishonestly by
delaying taillights, disabling side-lamps, etc. The closed-loop
view of the driver-vehicle-environment triplet is suggested in
Figure 2. While our work generally refers to human drivers,
we make it explicit that in Figure 2 the role of the human
driver (1) can be played by some autonomous driving module
(1’). Mutatis mutandis, our results can be easily re-interpreted
in the context of autonomous driving since electronic devices
may take similar decisions by interpreting visual and acoustic
signals from the environment.
The driver-vehicle-environment triplet forms a complex sys-
tem where adversarial behaviour on various components can
have serious consequences over multiple participants rather
than restricted effects on a single vehicle/driver. The relevance
of this broader image stems from the impact on other road
participants and opens the possibility for chain reactions that
put the problem at a larger scale involving hundreds of cars
rather than a single participant.
There are many factors influencing traffic safety, including
driver’s behaviour, the environment or vehicle condition, etc.
Some of these are in immediate reach for manipulation by an
adversary. In a comprehensive study on speed and safety [5]
published more than a decade ago, five factors are taken into
account, all of them are relevant to the context and models
addressed by our work:
1) headway - the distance between cars at a given speed
which is the key factor in chain-collisions,
2) vehicle speed and speed limitations - which are likely the
main factor in increasing or reducing traffic casualties,
3) environment - which not only dictates the safety speed
and headway but can also become adversarial in the
context addressed here (e.g., braking or turning without
signalling),
4) distractions - besides regular phones or smart-phones,
modern cars have complex infotainment units and media
streaming services that can distract the driver even more.
To bring more context to the problem we give a brief
account of driver behavior and existing regulations.
B. Driver behaviour and regulations
Assessing the real-world impact requires a crisper image
over the driver behaviour and perception. To get a more
realistic view on the context in which hazardous situations
take place, it is useful to caps on the following two recom-
mendations that serve as heuristics for most drivers:
1) Drive only so fast that the vehicle is under control. There
is general consensus that one should drive a vehicle only
so fast that the vehicle is still under control - we will call
this the safety rule. But drivers are not always prudent
and accidents due to speeding are still numerous, which
proves that this recommendation is either disregarded or
incorrectly used. Moreover, it turns out that drivers are
often wrong in assessing the speed at which the vehicle
is controllable. This is proved both by studies which
show driver inaccuracies in predicting the speed but
also by statistics which commonly points out that speed
limitations do greatly reduce the number of casualties
(which implies that drivers fail in estimating the safety
speed). According to some of the results summarized in
[17], decreasing the speed limit from 110 km/h to 90
km/h in Sweden lead to 21% decrease in fatal crashes,
while in Germany decreasing from 60 km/h to 50 km/h
lead to a decline in crashes by 20%, etc. Since prior to
such speed limitations, drivers did have in mind the safety
rule, it means that drivers are not that good in establishing
the safety speed and take the legal maximum for granted.
2) The 2 seconds rule or keep apart 2 chevrons. The
recommendation that the driver should stay 2 seconds
away from the vehicle in front seems to be generally
accepted in most European countries as well as in the US
[15]. The first problem with this rule is that 2 seconds
cannot guarantee a safe stopping distance (see Table I)
and can generally cover only the driver reaction time
which is at around 1.5 second. Another problem is that
drivers perception of distance to objects may not be very
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Fig. 2. The enhanced (closed-loop) view of the driver-vehicle-environment system: the driver (1) receiving inputs exerts mechanical actions over the vehicle
body (2) which in turn impacts the environment (3), all these mediated by potentially insecure communication
accurate. Commonly, the EU or US highways (the most
common place for car piles) require drivers to keep 2
chevrons between cars. Chevrons are graphically depicted
on the road and announced by sideways markings as
suggested in Figure 3. This is known, and proved by
scientific evidence, to reduce the number of accidents. In
[9] chevrons spaced by 36m (i.e., the 2-seconds bound)
are reported to reduce the speed by 1-3km/h and the
number of vehicles with less than 1s headway.
Fig. 3. Suggestive depiction of the chevrons highway marking
As proved by practical incidents, these heuristics are still far
from keeping accidents away and under adversarial vehicle
behavior the situation is even worse as we discuss in the
following sections.
C. Fixed parameters in our models
To serve as ground for a quantitative approach, the following
generally accepted numerical values are considered by us as
well:
1) Driver reaction time is generally considered as 1.5 sec-
onds. Experienced drivers commonly react at under 1
second while for elders 2 seconds are more realistic.
Standard reaction time can be greatly impaired in adver-
sarial conditions if the taillights are disabled since driver
decisions rely on the perceived distance to the car in front.
2) Speed regulations may tempt the driver to take the car
to the limit rather than adjust its speed according to the
2 seconds rule or the safety rule. Commonly accepted
maximum speed limitations include 50 km/h in cities, 100
km/h outside urban areas and 130 km/h on highways.
3) Kinetic friction coefficient is usually taken at 0.7 for
accident reconstructions. This can of course vary for
icy or wet surfaces but it is beyond the scope of our
presentation to consider such variations.
In Table I we include some values for the braking distance
under various conditions. It can be easily seen that the sum
between the distance caused by driver’s reaction time and the
braking distance quickly exceeds the distance travelled by the
car in 2 seconds. The 2-seconds rule has its limitations and
mostly works if the obstacle in front is also a braking vehicle
but cannot compensate in case of an immediate obstacle.
Another problem of the 2-chevrons rule in the context of ad-
versarial vehicle behavior is that chevrons are spaced assuming
a speed of 130 km/h, but if vehicle’s speed/speedometer is
manipulated the space between 2 chevrons (72m) no longer
corresponds to 2-seconds safety distance.
II. MODELS AND ADVERSARIAL BEHAVIOR FOR MULTIPLE
VEHICLE COLLISIONS
We begin by presenting a simple model for multiple vehicle
collisions then we add adversarial actions and discuss impact
on the model. Table II provides a summary for the notations
that we use in this section.
4TABLE I
DISTANCE DUE TO REACTION TIME, BRAKING AND THE 2-SECONDS RULE
speed (km/h) 20 30 50 90 130
distance at 1.5s reaction time (m) 8.3 12.5 20.8 37.5 54.1
braking distance (m) 2.2 5 14 45.5 95
distance in 2s (m) 11.1 16.6 27.7 50 72.2
b b b b
l l l l l
Fig. 4. Vehicles with length l at headway b
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
g acceleration due to gravity
m vehicle mass
µ friction coefficient
v vehicle speed
b headway
d braking distance
l vehicle length
δreact driver reaction time
ϑ speed increase due to adversarial manipulation
 decrease in reaction time due to adversarial intervention
vadv total reaction time after adversarial intervention
δadv vehicle speed after adversarial intervention
λ number of crashed vehicles
` safety headway in front of adversarial manipulation
A. Model for single lane multiple vehicle collision
In Figure 4 we present vehicles on a lane, the length of
a vehicle is l and the headway (space between vehicles) is
b. We proceed by modelling multiple collisions on a single
lane followed by an intersection and then we add adversarial
behaviour to these models.
The dynamics of vehicle braking are well understood. We
simply compute the braking distance by equating the kinetic
energy with the work done by braking, i.e.,
1
2
mv2 = µmgd (1)
Here m is vehicle’s mass, v its speed, µ is the friction
coefficient, g is the acceleration due to gravity and d is the
braking distance. The braking distance directly follows as:
d =
v2
2µg
(2)
These equations alone are sufficient to assess the severity
of an impact in case of vehicles at headway b as depicted in
Figure 4. The condition for the λ-th vehicle to collide follows
by requiring the distance to the vehicle in front, i.e., λb, to be
smaller than the braking distance plus the reaction time, i.e.,
d+ vλδreact . This leads to:
λb <
v2
2µg
+ λvδreact (3)
We assume that vδreact < b, since otherwise the headway
is too short, i.e., it takes too long for the driver to hit the
brakes, and immediate collision occurs. Then we easily obtain
an upper bound for λ:
λ <
v2
2µg
b− vδreact (4)
When b = vδreact the number of collisions tends to infinity.
An infinite number of collisions should not come as a surprise
since chain collisions involving more than one hundred cars
occurred on several occasions in the real-world (e.g., a 259
car pileup stretching over 30 km happened on the German
autobahn A2 in 20092). These real-world numbers can get
worse as in theory the number of collisions tends to infinity
when b approaches vδreact .
B. Adversary capabilities and impact of adversarial behaviour
There are a number of actions that can be taken by an
adversary, but in our model we do focus on two actions that
may not be even noticeable to the driver:
• Falsifying speedometer readings which will likely misled
the driver to run at a distinct speed. If the speedome-
ter presents false readings indicating a lower speed,
the driver will go faster, rather than assuming that
the speedometer is wrong. External readings from an
uncompromised device, e.g., some GPS software from
the mobile phone can alert the driver on a potential
malfunction, but such situations are out of scope for this
work (it is unlikely that all drivers will rely on external
measurements and even these can be compromised). We
modify regular vehicular speed by ϑ:
vadv ← v + ϑ (5)
• Delaying reaction time directly translates in adding an ad-
versarial delay to braking or to vehicle taillights. If brakes
are controller by electrical means, i.e., brake-by-wire
systems which are tentative replacement for mechanical
systems in the near future, such delays can be forced by
simply delaying messages on the bus. However, even for
mechanical systems the adversary can indirectly delay
the reaction time of the driver from behind by delaying
the taillights. Taillights were previously considered in
modelling multiple vehicle collisions [14] and clearly
they are a common source of accidents. Several studies
show that faster LED stop lamps are more effective
than light bulbs in reducing the number of collision (but
these seem controversial [8]). A fundamental work in the
visual control of braking [12] points out that if the lead
vehicle is without braking lights, the reaction time can be
2https://www.thelocal.de/20090720/20701
5longer than 2 seconds. This result is relevant as it clearly
renders the 2-second rule ineffective when taillights are
manipulated by adversaries. We consider that adversarial
actions in delaying or disabling the taillights result in a
delay  added to driver reaction time:
δadv ← δreact +  (6)
Impact. We consider useful to introduce the following two
metrics for adversarial capabilities:
• The ∞-collision bound is defined by the set of pairs
(ϑ, ) for which collision of an infinite number of ve-
hicles occurs. The dependence between ϑ and  can
be easily computed from the ∞-collision condition, i.e.,
b = vadvδadv , as:
(ϑ) =
b
v + ϑ
− δreact (7)
• The instant-reaction-collision speed gain ϑirc is the speed
induced by an adversary for which the driver cannot
stop the vehicle even if it instantly reacts to front-vehicle
braking. Assuming no adversarial delays and a 2-second
headway we have:
ϑirc = 2
√
vµg − v (8)
This follows from the fact that the instant-reaction-
collision speed gain requires the braking distance to be
equal to the headway:
b =
v2adv
2µg
(9)
In case of a 2-second rule headway as b = 2v and vadv ←
v + ϑ it follows:
2v =
v2 + 2vϑ+ ϑ2
2µg
⇒ ϑirc = 2
√
vµg − v (10)
To clarify this by a practical example consider the regular
highway speed v = 130km/h. Following the two seconds
rule (which was already proved not to be very efficient for
this case) we have a headway b = 72m. We discuss impact
on graphical representations.
On the left side of Figure 5 we depict the impact of speed
modifications on the number of collisions. At 30km/h there
are already more than 25 vehicle that collide. On the right
side of Figure 5 we depict the impact of modifications in the
reaction time. A small delay of 400ms is sufficient to lead to
more than 25 vehicle collisions. In both situations the number
of vehicles that collide grows drastically.
The left side of Figure 6 depicts the infinite collision bound
in relation to falsified speed and delayed reaction. Then on the
right side of Figure 6 we show the instant-reaction-collision
speed gain in relation with vehicle’s speed at a 2 second
headway.
Figure 7 combines modifications in speed and reaction time
in a 3D plot. A number of more than 100 collisions is quickly
reached. Then in Figure 8 we depict the∞-collisions bound. In
theory when b = vδreact an infinite number of collisions occur.
Fig. 5. Increase in the number of collisions with speed modification (left) and
with delayed reaction time (right) (at v = 130km/h and b = 72m based on
the 2 seconds rule)
Fig. 6. The ∞-collisions bound (left) at v = 130km/h, b = 72m based
on the 2 seconds rule and speed increase due to adversarial action to render
braking out of control (right)
Fig. 7. Increase in the number of collisions with speed modification and
delayed reaction time (v = 130km/h and b = 72m based on the 2 seconds
rule)
Fig. 8. The infinite collision bound for v ∈ [0, 130] (km/h)
This means that at speed v = 130km/h with the two second
rule headway b = 72m a reaction time of 1.999 leads to an
infinite number of collisions. Similarly, a speed of 172km/h
leads to an infinite number of collisions.
6C. Safety margins against adversarial behavior
We now try to determine new safety rules following the
potential impact of adversarial behaviour. Briefly, assuming
no adversarial delay for taillights, we determine that in case
of speed manipulations of at most 50% (i.e., ϑ/v = 0.5) the
2-second rule translates to 2-seconds plus 4% of vehicle speed
(in km/h). To state it otherwise, this means 2 seconds plus 1
second for each 25 km/h for a safe braking distance between
vehicles. We explain this result in what follows.
Assume that an `-seconds headway, i.e., b = `v , is safe,
then:
`v > δreactvadv +
v2adv
2µg
⇒ `v > δreact(v + ϑ) + (v + ϑ)
2
2µg
⇒ ` > δreact(1 + ϑ
v
) +
(v + ϑ)2
2vµg
(11)
As already mentioned, for accident reconstruction δreact =
1.5, µ = 0.7 are the norm. Since g = 9.8 it follows:
` > 1.5(1 +
ϑ
v
) + 0.07
(v + ϑ)2
v
(12)
In Figure 9 we graphically depict modifications of the
safety distance ` (expressed in seconds) in relation to vehicle
reported speed v and actual modifications by the adversary
ϑ. Generally, adversarial manipulation increases the safety
margin from 2–3 seconds up to 4–6 seconds.
Now we consider the adversarial speed modification ϑ as
some ratio ρ of the vehicle reported speed v , i.e., ϑ = ρv . It
follows that:
` > 1.5 + 1.5ρ+ 0.07(ρ+ 1)2v (13)
For a more convenient interpretation, since in the previ-
ous relation speed was expressed in m/s, to convert to the
speedometer scale in km/h we multiply by
1000
3600
= 0.27
which leads to:
` > 1.5 + 1.5ρ+ 0.019(ρ+ 1)2v ′ (14)
At a ratio ρ of at most 50% we have an approximate
minimum safety distance of ` ≈ 2 + 0.04v ′ and hence 2
seconds plus 1 second for each 25 km/h.
We now consider the impact of adversarial manipulation of
reaction time. Relation (11) now translates to:
` > (1.5 + )(1 +
ϑ
v
) + 0.07
(v + ϑ)2
v
(15)
We discuss the impact of this on graphical representations
from 3D plots. Figure 9 depicts the safety `-seconds headway
in relation to adversarial speed manipulation ϑ ∈ [0..30] and
vehicle speed v ∈ [0..130]. The safe headway is between
3 and 6 seconds. Figure 10 depicts the safety `-seconds
headway in relation to adversarial speed manipulation as
ratio from the actual speed ρv (10–25% considered) and the
delay in reaction time  ∈ (0..0.5) at reported vehicle speed
Fig. 9. Safety ` headway in relation to adversarial speed manipulation ϑ ∈
[0..30] and vehicle reported speed v ∈ [0..130]
Fig. 10. Safety ` headway in relation to adversarial speed manipulation ρv and
delay in reaction time  ∈ (0..0.5) at reported vehicle speed v = 90km/h
v = 90km/h. Similar to Figure 9, adversarial manipulation
increases the safety margin to 4–6 seconds, but note that in
contrast to Figure 9 now the reported vehicle speed is bound
to only v = 90km/h. Roughly speaking, assuming adversarial
manipulation of taillights, with a driver reaction time delayed
to at least 2 seconds, consistent with the report in [12], we
have:
` > 2 + 2ρ+ 0.019(ρ+ 1)2v (16)
This would dictate a safety rule of at least 3 seconds plus
1 second for each 25 km/h.
III. MODELS FOR SIMULATION AND RESULTS
In this section we derive models that are suitable for the
simulation of vehicle collisions on map overlays. We start with
a simple model for a single lane and continue with a multiple
lane intersection. For both we derive experimental results in
order to garner some sense of reality and of the impact on
real-world intersections.
A. Model for a vehicle formation on a single lane
A vehicle formation on a single lane heading toward an
obstacle is suggested in Figure 11 (the image is an overlay over
a map selected at random from OpenStreetMap3). The obstacle
3www.openstreetmap.org/
7is instanced in our scenario by a traffic light. Using the traffic
light as an obstacle is not accidental as this object is common
part of the environment and it can be also manipulated by an
adversary. In a worst case scenario, vehicles heading toward
it can have their speed modified and the traffic light may
be delayed, answering clearly to the theoretical scenarios
discussed in the previous section.
To derive collisions, modelling vehicle speed is necessary.
Vehicle speed is easy to adjust by considering the states of
the vehicle: i) the initial state when the vehicle is running at
vinit , ii) the braking stage and iii) the point when the vehicle
stops or collides with another vehicle or reaches the obstacle.
The vehicle is crashed and the speed is 0 when the distance
to the vehicle in front (or the obstacle) is smaller than the
vehicle length. Distinct to the theoretical models in section II,
we also embed here the length of the vehicles in defining a
collision. This is more realistic for a practical model as two
vehicles need a headway of one vehicle or they collide, but
has a smaller relevance from a gross theoretical estimation
as expressed in Section II. Until the driver reacts, i.e., time
iδreact for the i-th driver, the speed remains vinit . From the
time at which the driver starts braking, i.e., t ≥ iδreact , the
speed decreases by (t− iδreact)µg.
The following equation incorporates speed modifications
and the position of the vehicle which is adjusted based on
speed at a simulation step ∆t:

vi(t) =

0 iff |xi − xi−1| < vlen
vinit iff |xi − xi−1| ≥ vlen and t < iδreact
vinit − (t− iδreact)µg iff
|xi − xi−1| ≥ vlen and t ≥ iδreact
xi(t+ ∆t) = xi(t) + vi(t)∆t
(17)
In Table III we show the number of collisions as derived
from our simulation. We account for vehicle speeds v ∈
{20, 30, 50, 90} (km/h), adversarial modifications ϑ at 5% or
15% of the original speed and delayed reaction time by 100ms
or 200ms. The number of collisions is shown which starts
from a single vehicle at v = 20km/h and a modification
of just 1km/h with a 100ms delay for the traffic light. At
v = 90km/h and a modification of just 13.5km/h with a
200ms delay the number of collisions is λ = 53 vehicles.
Our model confirms the value of λ which also follows directly
from Equation 4. Care should be taken at choosing ∆t since
at higher speeds even a smaller ∆t can lead to significant
loss in the accuracy of the results. We generally worked in
our simulations with delays from a dozen to several hundred
milliseconds, the smaller the delay the higher the accuracy.
Figure 12 (left) gives the distances between the cars and
the obstacle at v = 20km/h, ϑ = 3km/h,  = 200ms, a case
for which 11 cars collided (see Table III). For the simulation
we considered 20 vehicles, then set ∆t = 10ms and run 4000
steps, a point at which all vehicles stopped. Distances between
cars appear to be equal but on a closer look to Figure 12
the first 11 cars have a headway of less than 5 meters while
the next 9 cars have a headway of only slightly more than 5
meters. Thus the last 9 cars were extremely close to a collision
Fig. 11. Simulation of vehicles on a single lane heading toward obstacle as
map overlay: 1 collision at 4.7s (left) and 6 collisions at 16.1s (right)
Fig. 12. Distance between each cars and the traffic light (left) and distance
between cars (right) at v = 20km/h, ϑ = 3km/h,  = 200ms
Fig. 13. Speed evolution (left) and distance between cars and stoplight (right)
in 4000 simulation steps at v = 130km/h, b = 72m at v = 20km/h,
ϑ = 3km/h,  = 200ms
as well. Figure 13 shows the speed evolution (left) and distance
between cars and stoplight (right) in 4000 simulation steps for
the same speed and adversarial modifications as previous.
B. Modelling multiple vehicle collisions at a crossroad
We now move to a more complex and more realistic
scenario: a vehicle crossroad as depicted in Figure 15. This
image is created as an overlap of our simulation on a real-
world intersection but names on the map are removed since
the scenario here is imaginary. The real-world intersection was
selected mostly at random from OpenStreetMap only to serve
as an example and we are not aware of specific traffic details.
A traffic simulation that is fully accurate to the real-world
8TABLE III
COLLISIONS ON A SINGLE LANE WITH ADVERSARIAL MODIFIED SPEED ϑ AND DELAYED REACTION TIME 
speed (km/h) 20 30 50 90
b (2-s rule) 11 16 27 50
ϑ (km/h) 1 3 1.5 4.5 2.5 7.5 4.5 13.5
 (ms) 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200 100 200
λ (collided cars) 1 2 3 11 2 3 5 17 3 5 8 29 6 9 15 53
RunningBraking
Crashed
Fig. 14. State transitions for a vehicle
model is not part of our goals here but may be subject of
future work and is easy to derive from the formalism that we
introduce. Now we simply place the cars on lanes as we feel
natural. In particular we consider 6 lanes with 10 cars on each,
resulting in 60 cars heading toward the intersection. Vehicle
size on the map is increased compared to the rest of the objects
to make vehicles visible. The headway between vehicles is the
2-seconds headway and its length is proportional with the size
of the car.
Modelling requires slight improvements over the previous
equations. We need to refine some notions by giving more
comprehensive definitions for vehicle and lanes, etc. In our
simulation we used the following formalism:
1) a vehicle is represented as a structure containing four
elements: speed v ∈ [0,∞], position pos ∈ [−∞,∞],
state state ∈ {Running ,Braking ,Crashed} and the
time at which state Braking was reached tbreak ∈ [0,∞],
i.e., car = {v , pos, state, tbreak},
2) a vehicle formation Σ is a collection of vehicles, i.e.,
Σ = {car0, car1, ..., carn−1},
3) a lane is represented as a structure containing four
elements: start-point Pstart , end-point Pstop ∈ R × R,
direction χ ∈ [−1, 1], angle φ ∈ [0, 2pi] and stop
signs SSigs = {d0, d1, ..., dl−1} (where di, i = 0..l − 1
denotes the position of each stop sign), i.e., lane =
{Pstart , Pstop , χ, φ,SSigs},
4) we define a traffic model M as a collection of lanes
Λ = {lane0, lane1, ..., lanen−1} each holding one vehi-
cle formation Σi, i ∈ {0..n− 1}, i.e., M = Λ× Σ,
5) the intersection points of a traffic
model M are the list of pairs ⊕ =
{p0 = {(x′0, y′0), (x′′0 , y′′0 )}...pl = {(x′l, y′l), (x′′l , y′′l )}}.
Again each vehicle must start braking either when the
vehicle in front brakes or when the stop sign becomes visible.
We find it easier to visualize the vehicle as transiting between
the three states: running, braking or crashed as depicted in
Figure 14. A car is crashed if is already crashed or there exists
another vehicle that collides with it in the current step. If it is
not crashed then the car is running if it is not braking and is
braking if the vehicle in front does so or the stop sign becomes
visible. This is summarized by the following formalism for the
vehicle state:

Crashed iff Crashed(car i) ∨ ∃k.Collides(car i, cark)
Running iff ¬Crashed(car i) ∧ ¬Braking(car i)
Braking iff ¬Crashed(car i)
∧ (BrakingOrCrashed(car i−1) ∨ SVisible(car i))
We use several predicates to get the state of a ve-
hicle, i.e., Running(car i), Braking(car i), Crashed(car i),
BrakingOrCrashed(car i), to determine collisions between ve-
hicles, i.e., Collides(car i, car j), and to establish if a stop-sign
is visible for a car, i.e., SVisible(car i). These can be all simply
derived from the car location on the map. The coordinates of
each car can be easily extracted from the position of the car
on the lane, the angle of the lane and its coordinates as:
getx(car i) = xlane · sin(φ) + cos(φ) · GetPos(car i) (18)
gety(car i) = ylane · cos(φ) + sin(φ) · GetPos(car i) (19)
Subsequently, the distance between the car and the other
object can be computed as Euclidean distance. Checking that
a car collides with another car or that a stop-sign is visible
simply requires checking the distance between objects. Two
vehicles collide if the distance between them is smaller than
the vehicle length and a stop sign becomes visible as soon as
it reaches the visual range of the driver.
To run the simulation we need rules for updating vehicle
speed v , position pos and state state . The state state is
updated as shown in Figure 14, the vehicle runs if the car
in front is not crashed and not braking, otherwise the vehicle
brakes. Similarly, vehicles brake if the stop-sign is visible.
Speed adjustment is done according to the vehicle state and
the previously defined adjustment rules, the same is done for
vehicle position:

vi(t) =

0 iff Crashed(car i)
vinit iff Running(car i)
vinit − (t− tbreak )µg iff Braking(car i)
xi(t+ ∆t) = xi(t) + vi(t)∆t
(20)
We now show simulation results and discuss them on
graphical representations. First we consider the case of: v =
9Fig. 15. Simulation of vehicles on multiple lanes heading toward crosspoint as overlay on a map: (1) vehicle collision in the middle of the intersection, (2)
vehicles that are braking and (3) one vehicle departing from the intersection
30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ = 1.5km/h,  = 0ms, i.e., no delay
in the taillights, and 10 vehicle on each of the lanes from
Figure 15 leading to a total of 60 vehicles. Figure 16 plots
the distance of each car to the center of the intersection also
showing the state of each car. Figure 18 plots the evolution
for the speed of each car. Figure 19 plots the distance of each
car to the center of the intersection. Section (1) of the plot
depicts the cars that are crashed or successfully brake, section
(2) cars approaching the intersection and section (3) the cars
that are departing from the intersection (no collision in front).
In Figure 20 the evolution of distance between each cars and
the car from the rear, i.e., the headway, is shown. We mark by
(1) the cars that crashed, (2) marks the cars that stopped at a
safe distance and (3) the cars that depart from the intersection
and have a constant headway. Note that in sector (3) one of
the cars has an increasing headway, this is the case of the car
from the first horizontal lane that successfully departs from
the intersection while the rest of the cars from its lane have
crashed (the car can be easily identified in Figure 15).
We give similar graphical depictions for v = 30km/h, b =
16m, ϑ = 4.5km/h,  = 200ms in Figures 17, 21, 22and
23. The number of crashed vehicles is much higher with only
5 vehicles that successfully stopped. Again, 1 vehicle on the
first lane and the 10 vehicles on the 3-rd are escaping the
collision, but distinct to the previous case where more than
30 cars managed to brake, now only 5 managed to brake in
time and the rest are crashed. Similarly, in Figures 22 and
23 we mark the three areas (1) crashed vehicles, (2) stopped
vehicles and (3) vehicles running. In this case area (1) clearly
conglomerates more crashed vehicles.
IV. INTELLIGENT ADVERSARIAL BEHAVIOR
We design intelligent adversarial behaviour around two
actions: adversarial platoon formation and stealthy speed
modifications. By the first we account for the adversary ability
to coagulate a formation of cars for which it manipulates their
speeds. By the former we account for speed modifications that
are smooth and harder to detect by human agents.
A. Adversarial platoon formation
The addressed setup is suggested in Figure 24. Vehicles
are depicted arriving on the lane at a constant rate α. For
simplicity we assume that vehicles arrival times are equidis-
tant, this leads to a headway b∗ = vα−1. The adversary
target is to coagulate compromised cars in a single platoon at
headway b. We quantify adversarial capability for adversarial
platoon formation in a theorem that fixes the probability for
an adversary to form a platoon of some fixed size in a given
time T . We then instantiate this result with practical values to
give some hints on adversarial capabilities.
Theorem 1. Let a vehicle lane and the following predefined
constants: the imposed vehicle speed on the lane v , the legal
headway between vehicles b, the arrival rate of the vehicles on
the lane α, the probability that a vehicle is corrupted by the
adversary padv and the maximum modification rate ρ of speed
by adversary intervention. Assume that the time to cover the
entire length of the lane at speed v is longer than some fixed
value T (this fixes the time-horizon for adversarial actions).
Then there exists an adversary capable to form platoons of
expected size padvN where:
N =
2ρvT + b
vα−1 + b
(21)
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Fig. 16. Distance between each cars at v = 30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ =
1.5km/h,  = 0ms
Fig. 17. Distance between each cars at v = 30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ =
4.5km/h,  = 200ms
Fig. 18. Speed evolution at v = 30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ = 1.5km/h,  =
0ms
Fig. 19. Distance evolution at v = 30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ = 1.5km/h,
 = 0ms
Fig. 20. Headway evolution at v = 30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ = 1.5km/h,
 = 0ms
Fig. 21. Speed evolution at v = 30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ = 4.5km/h,  =
200ms
Fig. 22. Distance evolution at v = 30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ = 4.5km/h,
 = 200ms
Fig. 23. Headway evolution at v = 30km/h, b = 16m, ϑ = 4.5km/h,
 = 200ms
11
vα-1 
l l l l l l l l l
padv1-padv
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Fig. 24. Setup for adversarial platoon formation: vehicles arriving on the lane at rate α and with corruption probability padv
Moreover, let:
ζk,T = Pr
{
AdvForm
[
k, T
]}
the probability of the event AdvForm
[
k, T
]
that the adver-
sary constructs an adversarial platoon formation of exactly k
cars in time T . Then:
ζk,T =
N !
k!(N − k)!p
k
adv (1− padv )N−k (22)
and in case of small corruption rates padv and large time
horizon T , by Poisson approximation:
ζk,T ≈ e−Npadv (Npadv )
k
k!
(23)
.
Proof. We consider a discrete time simulation with the
length of each step set at ∆t. For the fixed time horizon T
and simulation step ∆t, let the number of steps be θ = T/∆t.
We define the speed manipulation for each vehicle in each
time-step ∆t during time horizon θ as:
Ψk,θ =

ϑ11 ϑ
1
2 ϑ
1
3 . . . ϑ
1
θ
ϑ21 ϑ
2
2 ϑ
2
3 . . . ϑ
2
θ
...
...
...
. . .
...
ϑk1 ϑ
k
2 ϑ
k
3 . . . ϑ
k
θ

and the initial positions of the vehicles as:
Xk,1(0) =

x1(0)
x2(0)
...
xk(0)

We define the all-ones matrices:
Jk,θ =

1 1 1 . . . 1
1 1 1 . . . 1
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 1 . . . 1
 , Jk,1 =

1
1
...
1

Then assuming constant vehicle speed v , at time θ the
positions of the vehicles is given by:
Xk,1(θ) =
(
v · Jk,θ + Ψk,θ
)
×
(
∆t · Jk,1
)
+ Xk,1(0)
Where the center dot · denotes scalar multiplication and the
multiplication sign × denotes vector product. To coagulate all
vehicles in a single platoon, we need the headway between
vehicles after time θ to be equal to constant b regardless of
initial positions given in Xk,1(0). Concretely, we have:
xi(θ)− xi−1(θ) = b,∀i = 2..k
This is equivalent to:
∆t
∑
i=1,θ
(
ϑ2i − ϑ1i
)
+ x2(0)− x1(0) = b
∆t
∑
i=1,θ
(
ϑ3i − ϑ2i
)
+ x3(0)− x2(0) = b
. . .
∆t
∑
i=1,θ
(
ϑki − ϑk−1i
)
+ xk(0)− xk−1(0) = b
By summing up all of the above lines we get:
∆t
∑
i=1,θ
(
ϑki − ϑ1i
)
+ xk(0)− x1(0) = b(k − 1)
⇒
∑
i=1,θ
(
ϑki − ϑ1i
)
=
b(k − 1)− xk(0) + x1(0)
∆t
Note that this relation is independent of the target vehicle
speed v since all drivers intend to maintain it and cancels upon
summation. Consequently, speed manipulation must compen-
sate for the headway of k vehicles, i.e., b(k − 1), and the
difference between the initial positions of the two vehicles,
i.e., xk(0)− x1(0).
If there exists adversarial manipulation vectors ϑk and ϑ1
such that previous relation holds for time horizon θ, then for all
other cars there exists ϑj , j = 2..k− 1 to satisfy this relation.
This is because the distance between them and the lead car is
smaller and can be recovered with lesser speed manipulations.
Assume now the maximum adversarial speed manipulation
as rate ρ of the actual speed, i.e., ϑ = ρv . Worst case, the speed
of vehicle k needs to be modified by ρv and that of vehicle
1 by −ρv (the lead vehicle must go slower for the other to
recover distance). Thus the condition for the vehicles to reach
the adversarial platoon formation formation is satisfied if and
only if:
2θρv ≥ b(k − 1)− xk(0) + x1(0)
∆t
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From which we have:
x1(0)− xk(0) ≤ 2∆tθρv − b(k − 1)
Note that the term form the left side denotes the distance
between the first and the last compromised car. We translate
this to the time at which each car arrives on the lane. The time
at which the first car arrives is t = 0 since this is the lead car.
Then let the time at which the k-th car arrives be tk. Having
arrival rate α we have tk = kα−1 and:
x1(0)− xk(0) = vtk = vkα−1
Which leads to:
k ≤ 2ρvT + b
vα−1 + b
This fixes the maximum number of vehicles for which
adversarial behaviour can be accounted in time T , i.e.,
N =
2ρvT + b
vα−1 + b
Now equation 22 simply gives the probability of k success
out of N in a Bernoulli trial with probability padv . A suffi-
ciently large time horizon T implies a larger N and a small
padv leads to the Poisson approximation in equation 23.
We now consider as example the case of a lane with
vehicles at speed v = 130km/h, i.e., a high-way lane. Vehicle
corruption probability is set at padv ∈ [0.01, 0.25], that is,
from 1 in 100 cars up to 1 in 4 cars can be adversarial.
We consider arrival rate α ∈ [0.05, 0.5], i.e., from 1 car at
each 20 seconds to 1 car every 2 seconds. Figure 25 depicts
the expected platoon size under these variations. The size
of the platoon can grow to almost 50 cars when corruption
probability and arrival rate is high, all these cars can be
concentrate by an adversary in a single platoon after 1 hour.
Figure 26 shows probability to form a platoon of expected
size which is sufficiently high, roughly between 0.15 and 0.5.
Figure 27 depicts the probability that an adversary forms a
platoon of 30 cars. This probability is initially very low but
steadily grows once corruption rate reaches 10% and arrival
rate grows to 1 car every 5 seconds, i.e., α = 0.2.
B. Stealthy speed manipulation functions
So far our models assumed constant modification of vehicle
speed ϑ. A sudden increase or decrease in speedometer value
may however be easily noticeable by the driver. Research
results in the area of perception clearly establish that: it
is the gradualness of change that makes acceleration and
deceleration difficult to perceive [16]. Consequently, it seems
natural to turn the adversarial manipulation into a sigmoid-
like function that smoothly increases and decreases over time.
This seems to be consistent with regular behavior of drivers
that once starting to accelerate/brake will likely be tempted to
continue further. We depict some suggestive shapes for stealthy
speed modifications by an adversary in Figure 28.
We now extend our model to an adversary that is able to
modify speeds at this finer granularity. We assume that the
Fig. 25. The expected platoon size at v = 130km/h, T = 1h with padv ∈
[0.01, 0.25] and arrival rate α ∈ [0.05, 0.5]
Fig. 26. Probability of adversarial platoons of the expected size at v =
130km/h, T = 1h with padv ∈ [0.01, 0.25] and arrival rate α ∈ [0.05, 0.5]
Fig. 27. Probability of an adversarial platoon when only 30 corrupted cars
have reached the lane v = 130km/h, T = 1h with padv ∈ [0.01, 0.25] and
arrival rate α ∈ [0.05, 0.5]
adversary has a fixed time horizon T for achieving this goal
similar to the setup provided in the previous theorem.
Theorem 2. In the setup of Theorem 1, let the constant speed
modification χ for vehicle k be:
χ(k) =
xk(0)− x1(0)− b(k − 1)
T
(24)
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Fig. 28. Possible speed modifications by an adversary over a time-horizon
of 60 minutes
Then
ϑk(t) =

2χ(k)
℘t−T/4 + 1
iff t ∈ [0, T/2)
2χ(k)
(
1− 1
℘t−3T/4 + 1
)
iff t ∈ [T/2, T ]
(25)
Provides a smooth acceleration/deceleration adversarial
modification of speed, where ℘ is computed as function over
the time-horizon T and a smoothness factor σ as
℘ = 1− σT−1 (26)
Proof. We show that the adversarial speed gain over time
horizon T is the same as in the case of constant speed
modification, that is, we prove that:
∫ T
0
ϑ(t)dt = χ(k)T = xk(0)− x1(0)− b(k − 1)
First note that ϑ(t) is symmetrical around T/2, that is:
ϑ(T/2− i) = ϑ(T/2 + i),∀i ∈ [0, T/2]
This follows easily since:
ϑ(T/2 + i) = 2χ
(
1− 1
℘T/2+i−3T/4 + 1
)
=
= 2χ
(
1− 1
℘i−T/4 + 1
)
= 2χ
(
1− ℘
T/4−i
℘T/4−i + 1
)
=
= 2χ
1
℘T/4−i + 1
= ϑ(T/2− i),∀i ∈ [0, T/2] (27)
Then:
∫ T
0
ϑ(t)dt = 2
∫ T/2
0
ϑ(t)dt = 2
∫ T/2
0
2χ
℘t−T/4 + 1
dt =
= 2
[∫ T/4
0
ϑ(T/4− t)dt+
∫ T/4
0
ϑ(T/4 + t)dt
]
=
= 4χ
∫ T/4
0
1
℘−t + 1
+
1
℘t + 1
dt = 4χ
∫ T/4
0
1dt = χ(k)T
which completes the proof.
Fig. 29. Trajectory of the platoon
during 60 minutes
Fig. 30. Detail for the trajectory of
the platoon during last 5 minutes
Fig. 31. Speed gain for each vehicle
in the platoon during the 60 minutes
Fig. 32. Speed gain in percents of
the reported vehicle speed during the
60 minutes
Fig. 33. Headway for each vehicle
in the platoon during the 60 minutes
Fig. 34. Detail on headway for each
vehicle in the platoon during the 60
minutes
We now discuss some suggestive graphical depictions for
stealthy speed modifications. A formation of 20 vehicles
moving at 130 km/h is considered during a time-frame T =
60min. The corrupted vehicles are randomly spaced on the
lane (see the initial headway b in the plots that follow)
accounting for a randomized corruption rate of 3%. The
smoothness factor is set to σ = 10. First, in Figure 30 we
show the trajectory of vehicles during 60 minutes. The detail
in Figure 30 shows that during the last 5 minutes the vehicles
are equally spaced (the distance between them is the target
b). Figure 31 shows the speed gain and Figure 32 the speed
gain in percents during the 60 minutes, it is only in the 30-th
minute that the last vehicle has a speed gain of 20% reaching
about 154km/h, for the rest of the vehicles the speed gain
is lower. Figure 33 shows the evolution of headways between
vehicles and Figure 34 gives a detail on this, the headway
quickly drops when the speed increases in the middle of the
interval.
Speed modifications as previously depicted appear smooth
and may stay stealthy to human drivers. Deciding how stealthy
they are requires further studies in the area of human percep-
tion and is out of reach for the current work.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the numerous attacks reported so far, adversarial
behaviour has not been previously included in traffic models
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nor does it appears to be considered in the numerous safety
technologies embedded in modern cars. As long as cars are not
fully secure, adversarial behaviour is a realistic concern. Even
small delays in the reaction time due to adversarial actions,
e.g. delayed taillights, or small variations in vehicle speed, e.g.,
by speedometer modifications, can have serious consequences.
We have emphasized this in our models for chain-collisions
and provided metrics for adversarial effects by the infinite-
collision bound and the instant-reaction-collision speed gain.
Proof-of-concept map overlays have shown the effects of
such manipulations on more realistic situations. Finally, our
discussion on intelligent adversarial behaviour proves that
it is within reach for adversaries to coagulate compromised
cars in adversarial platoons that can be further exploited in
creating chain collisions. Due to the lack of maturity for in-
vehicle security technologies, modelling adversarial behaviour
for vehicles in traffic should be considered in anticipation of
attack scenarios. We hope that our work paves way in this
direction.
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